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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of disclosing corporate tax reports on the performance of 
financial markets and the use of asset prices by the tax enforcement agency in order to infer the 
true corporate cash flows. We model the interaction between a firm and the tax auditing agency, 
and highlight the role played by the tax report as a public signal used by the market dealer and 
the role of prices as a signal used by the tax authority. We discuss the determinants of both the 
reporting strategy of the firm and the auditing policy of the tax authority. Our model suggests that, 
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disclose the tax report when its objective is to maximize expected net tax collection. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study whether is desirable or not to make firm’s tax statements public.
We analyze how the disclosure of the tax report aﬀects both the tax agency revenue and the
performance of the financial market where the shares of the firm are traded. We argue that
although the disclosure of the tax report improves market performance, it might, depending on
market conditions, increase or decrease the expected net revenue of the tax agency. Therefore,
despite disclosure being beneficial for market performance, the tax agency might decide not to
make public the tax report because the release of this report has a negative impact on its revenue.
Corporate disclosure is essential for the functioning of financial markets. However, the extent
to which firms benefit from increased disclosure still remains a very controversial issue. In the
United States the tax return information was public from the time of Civil War and it was
restricted only in 1976, when the Tax Reform Act of 1976 made the tax return confidential. The
debate on disclosure of corporate tax return information became more active after the problems
of Enron, WorldCom and other important U.S. corporations. As Hanlon (2003) points out tax
statements required under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles do not easily permit the
users of financial statements to estimate taxable income. Thus, limited disclosure can create
divergence between book and tax income because the firm may under-report to the IRS while
they may over-report to the shareholders. “Book profits and tax profits can be wildly diﬀerent
— a divergence, by the way, that increased markedly in the 1990s” (The Corporate Reform Tax
Cut, 29 January 2003, The Wall Street Journal).
The debate reached a peak in July 2002, when the Senator Charles Grassley, the chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to put forward for consideration the question
of whether the corporate tax returns should be made public and the eﬀect the disclosure of the tax
return would have on public welfare. The debate among academics, practitioners, government
policy makers and media was very intensive. On the one hand, the disclosure of tax return
information is considered to be beneficial for the well-functioning of financial markets as it
encourages tax compliance due to the reputational implications of disclosure. On the other
hand, the disclosure is seen to prevent tax enforcement because of the dilution of the information
content of tax return due to the fact that it could also reveal information that can put the firms
which are forced to disclose information at a disadvantage versus those which are not forced to
disclose any information (see Lenter et al., 2003). The responses of the SEC and the Treasury
Department were negative, the principal claim being that disclosure was beneficial only in certain
circumstances and it does not bring about a significant improvement in the task of SEC’s ability to
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protect investors. However, despite of the fact that this objective is not satisfied, the disclosure of
corporate tax return might improve the functioning of financial markets. As a result of this debate,
in 2003 a bill that asked for public disclosure of corporate tax return information was submitted
to the Congress but it failed. In 2006, the accounting norms represented by Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) Financial Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income
Taxes (FIN 48) standardized financial reporting of tax uncertainty providing measurement of
income tax reserves in financial statements and it made mandatory its public disclosure.1
In 2012 the President Obama’s Framework for Business Tax Reform called for an increase in
disclosure of annual corporate income tax: “Corporate tax reform should increase transparency
and reduce the gap between book income, reported to shareholders, and taxable income reported
to IRS. These reforms could include greater disclosure of annual corporate income tax payments.”2
As Hasegawa et al. (2013) point out, this debate took place in the complete absence of empirical
evidence of taxpayers responses to income tax disclosure and in the absence of any theoretical
framework that could show the eﬀects of the public disclosure of the corporate tax report. Our
paper, aims to fill in partially the lack of theoretical models that study the eﬀect of disclosure of
the tax report on financial markets and on tax compliance.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is connected to three strands of the literature: the literature on tax compliance/tax
evasion, the literature on disclosure of information by firms, and the literature on the use of
information revealed by the security prices. The literature on tax evasion points out that the way
in which an individual/firm perceives his/its economic opportunities to be aﬀected by the tax
code and by the instruments of tax enforcement is extremely important because the tax system
and its enforcement may induce the taxpayer to hide or misrepresent some of his activities. The
taxpayer may perceive certain choices with regard to tax declaration, financial transactions, or
economic activity to be potentially costly as they are subject to the threat of exposure and
penalty. If so, then this perception would influence such choices and these choices will aﬀect in
1See Mills et al. (2010), Blouin et al. (2010) and Lisowsky et al. (2013) for a detailed FIN 48 analysis.
2Other recent regulations in place are targeting specific industries. Thus, the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, signed on July 2010, requires that SEC registrants in an extraction industry must
annually report payments made by the company to the U.S. and foreign goverments by projects and by country.
The payments to be disclosed include taxes, royalties, bonuses and dividends. On February 28, 2013, the European
Union Parliament approved country-by-country reporting for European banks of data on employees, profits, and
taxes paid.
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turn the functioning of the economy in diﬀerent ways.
The literature that analyzes the taxpayer compliance has as a starting point the papers that
take a portfolio approach, where potential evaders face a probability of being caught and paying
the corresponding penalty. Thus, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974) and Polinsky
and Shavell (1979) consider the decision concerning evasion when all the taxpayers face a constant
probability of auditing by the tax agency. This assumption was criticized by Reinganum and
Wilde (1986), who point out that the tax report contains information about the true realization
of the taxpayers’ income and, consequently, that the probability of auditing should depend on the
report made by the taxpayers. They model tax compliance as a game with incomplete information
where first the tax payer reports his payoﬀ, and then the tax auditing agency chooses the
auditing probability depending on the payoﬀ reported by the taxpayer. While the above papers
incorporated the uncertainty about the tax liabilities, another strand of research was concerned
with the other sources of randomness that alter the interaction between the taxpayers and the
tax auditing agency. Therefore, some authors incorporated in their models the fact that the tax
code is complex and can lead to involuntary mistakes even when the taxpayers want to comply
with the law. For instance, Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989) consider the case where the ambiguity
of the law gives place to a random auditing policy depending on the interpretation given to the
law. Reinganum and Wilde (1998) incorporate in the model the taxpayers’s uncertainty about
auditing cost, while Caballé and Panadés (2005) allow for both mistakes made by taxpayers
and uncertainty about auditing cost. Beck and Jung (1989a) examine tax compliance in an
environment in which taxpayers are also uncertain regarding their tax liability (because of the
tax law complexity) and by simultaneously considering diﬀerent tax rate structures and risk-
taking attitudes, while Beck and Jung (1989b) examine this problem taking into account that
audit probabilities are endogenous. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Chen and Chu (2005) study
also the problem of tax compliance in a principal-agent framework while Sansing (1993), Mills
and Sansing (2000), Beck et al. (2000) and Mills et al. (2010) allow the tax auditing agency to
observe a signal regarding the taxpayer, which aﬀects their strategic interaction.3
Our work is also in line with the stream of literature that is concerned with the role of
information disclosure by firms, and the consequence of the disclosure on asset prices and on
traders’ welfare. Disclosure can be interpreted as a choice of an accounting technique or a
committed policy of making public earnings or other forecasts. In general, the research in
this field focuses on the role played by disclosure in reducing the asymmetry of information
3For a more extended review of both theoretical and empirical tax research see Shackelford and Shevlin (2001)
and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010).
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among investors, which can give raise to adverse selection in the financial market, and studies
its consequences on firm valuation. Thus, in a rational expectations equilibrium model with
endogenous information collection, Diamond (1985) shows that the welfare of stockholders may
be improved by disclosing private data. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) complete the analysis
begun in Diamond by showing that disclosure policies that reduce the asymmetry of information
among investors also increase the market liquidity of a security. The increase in the liquidity of
the stock is very important for firms because it reduces the cost of capital and therefore increases
the value of the firm (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996,
and Amihud, 2002). Verrechia (2001) points out also that corporate disclosure is very important
for reducing the transactions costs that result from diﬀerences in information of the investors
participating in the financial market or what he calls “the information asymmetry component of
the cost of capital”. On one hand, it reduces the incentives of the traders to become privately
informed (so it reduces the probability of informed trading) and, on the other hand, it reduces
the uncertainty about the firm value and therefore the potential gains from being informed.
The previous theoretical literature gave rise to a significant empirical literature that studies
the costs and the benefits of information disclosure by firms and the economic consequences of
regulation disclosure and changes in regulation (most recent in the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Fair Disclosure Regulation). For detailed surveys, see Core (2001), Dye (2001), Healy and
Palepu (2001), Verrechia (2001), Leuz and Wysocki (2008).
The papers we have just reviewed are concerned mainly with how information about the firm
is disseminated through financial reporting and how managers in charge of information disclosure
aﬀect the information environment and therefore the liquidity of the firm’s stock. Though the
eﬀects of mandatory disclosure of the tax report and the value of the firm has been studied before,
the literature concerned with the eﬀects of the tax report disclosure on the performance of the
financial markets has been scant. This paper provides, as far as we know, the first model to
analyze how disclosure of the tax report and the strategic interaction between the firm and the
tax agency aﬀects the performance of the financial markets where the firm’s shares are traded.
Recent research studies the link between tax avoidance and the value of the firm (showing that
tax avoidance activities can facilitate managerial opportunism, such as earnings manipulation
and outright resource diversion and therefore have an eﬀect on firm value) but not the eﬀect of
tax avoidance on the liquidity of the firm’s shares. Thus, Desai et al. (2007) develop a model in
which corporate tax sheltering activity and the diversion of rents by managers are interrelated.
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find that there is a positive impact of tax avoidance on firm value
for firms with good governance, while Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find a negative stock market
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reaction to news concerning company involvement in tax shelters. Kim et al. (2010) explores
the association between the extent of a firm’s tax avoidance and its future stock price crash
risk. The previous papers present theoretical models and empirical evidence challenging the view
that postulates that tax avoidance enhances the value of the firm since the cash savings from
tax avoiding activities can be interpreted as cash flows appropriated by the firm from the tax
authorities, which increases expected future cash flows. The only paper closer to our work is Lee
et al. (2013) who examine empirically the relation between tax avoidance and firm’s cost of equity
and show that non-aggressive tax planning induce lower cost of equity capital.
Finally, our paper is also related to an even more recent literature that emphasizes the
informative content of prices (see Kanodia, 2006, Bond et al., 2011, Edmans et al., 2015, Siemroth,
2015). According to this literature, the prices of financial assets reveal information that can be
used for decision taking and, moreover, there is a feedback eﬀect due to the fact that firm managers
are aware of this potential use of prices and modify their actions so that the value of the firm is
adjusted accordingly. In our setup, the tax agency observes the market value of the firm and can
infer partially the cash flow of the firm. Then, the manager optimally reacts by manipulating the
market value of the firm through the selection of the accuracy of the tax report sent to the tax
enforcement agency and potentially observed by the market dealer.
1.2 Preview of the Model and Results
We model the strategic interaction between a tax enforcement agency and a firm, when there is
an insider trader, which is the manager who has the possibility of trading in financial markets
based on the information he possesses about the firm. Note that the presence of insider trading
allows the prices of the firm’s shares to contain information about the true cash flows of the firm.
We also study the eﬀects of that interaction between the manager and the tax authority on the
performance of the financial market. More specifically, we are interested in understanding how
tax report disclosure aﬀects stock valuation and liquidity and how the interaction between the
tax auditing agency and the firm changes the behavior of the insider while trading in the financial
market. Note that the tax report strategically chosen by the manager has an eﬀect both on the
strategy of the tax enforcement agency and on the own trading strategy of the manager.
In order to understand how the tax report, which is an endogenous public signal, aﬀects
market performance and tax compliance, we model a game with incomplete information where
the manager chooses the tax report and the tax auditing agency chooses its auditing eﬀort. Since
misleading tax reporting may induce misleading understanding of the financial performance of the
firm, the manager is cautious about the report he files with the tax agency. Then, the manager
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trades in the financial market based on his private information about the realization of the firm’s
payoﬀ. The trading is modeled using a dealer market model similar to Glosten and Milgrom
(1985). The interaction between the manager and the tax auditing agency leads to the release
of a public signal which is endogenously determined. When the tax report becomes public, the
dealer uses this information in setting the prices in the trading stage; and we thus argue that
the endogenous public signal plays an important role on market performance in general, and on
liquidity in particular.
In this setup we find that the manager always sends false tax reports to the tax enforcement
agency when the tax report is disclosed. This is so because both the noise inherent in the pricing
process and the costly inspections faced by the agency make the expected profits from insider
trading positive when the endogenous public signal is totally uninformative. Therefore, our result
that taxpayers cheat more under disclosure is also consistent with that found in the empirical
paper of Hasegawa et al. (2013). In this paper, the authors use data from individual and corporate
taxpayers in Japan to find that, when there is a threshold for disclosure, taxpayers whose tax
liability would otherwise be close to the threshold will underreport in order to avoid disclosure
and this behavior results in lower government revenues.
Our model contributes also to the literature by answering some of the questions in the debate
of the benefits of disclosure. We show that the disclosure of the endogenous signal has a beneficial
eﬀect on market performance because it reduces bid-ask spreads and trading costs. However, it
is not always the case that it is beneficial for the tax agency to disclose this information as the
taxpayers tend to cheat more and, therefore, the tax agency might decide not to make public the
tax reports.
We also show that, unlike in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), where the liquidation value is
exogenously given, the market performance depends on the tax agency eﬃciency measured by
the value of its auditing costs. Thus, we find that market liquidity (measured by the size of
the bid-ask spread) is non-monotonic with respect to the auditing cost when the report is not
disclosed. On the one hand, for small auditing costs, the tax agency is able to undo the eﬀect of
misreporting by the manager. The market maker uses this information and sets a constant ask
price relative to the auditing cost. On the other hand, the manager’s misreporting introduces some
additional noise when the market maker observes a sell (which can be the order of an uninformed
trader when the manager is strategic and chooses to misreport and it is costly for the tax agency
to monitor). Therefore, this noise introduced by the manager makes the market maker to set a
bid price that increases with the auditing cost. When the auditing cost becomes high enough,
since the tax agency is ineﬃcient, the manager’s strategy is always to misreport. As the market
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maker understands that the tax agency is ineﬃcient, the manager can misreport more often and,
in this case, he is more likely to trade against the informed trader so that he sets a wider bid-ask
spread. However, when the tax report is disclosed, the bid-ask spread monotonically increases
with the tax agency’s auditing costs. This latter result is consistent with the empirical findings
on the eﬃciency of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) presented by El Ghoul et al. (2011) who
show that a more eﬀective IRS auditing is associated with lower cost of capital.
When we study the behavior of the spreads as a response to an increase in the probability of
trading against an informed trader, we find that, when the report is not disclosed, the market
maker sets a wider bid-ask spread, which is a result also found in the original Glosten-Milgrom
model. However, if the report is disclosed, since the liquidation value is determined endogenously
by the interaction between the manager and the tax agency, the market maker faces a trade-oﬀ
between a higher probability of trading against the insider manager and a lower liquidation value
induced by higher auditing intensity by the tax agency. As a result, in this case (unlike in the
Glosten-Milgrom model) the market liquidity has an inverted U-shape with respect to the amount
of noise trading in the financial market, which is a
Since we want to understand the capacity of the tax agency to reduce tax evasion, we also
study the behavior of the expected net revenue collected by the tax agency. As in other models
of tax evasion the more ineﬃcient the tax agency, the lower its net tax revenue is. However, since
the auditing strategy is contingent on the tax report of the manager, which is chosen to maximize
manager’s profits from the financial market, the auditing intensities depend on how often the
manager is selected to trade in the financial market. The expected tax revenue increases thus
with the likelihood of the manager being selected to trade since the more often he can make
profits, the more incentives he has to misreport and therefore the more penalties he pays to the
tax agency when caught.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. We
establish the information structure and characterize the equilibrium in two situations: when the
tax report is disclosed and when it is not. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀects of the public release
of the firm’s tax reports. Section 4 presents the results of some comparative statics exercises
for market performance and expected net tax agency’s revenue, respectively. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper. The Appendix contains the main proofs of the paper.
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2 The Model
Our model is based on the classical dealer market model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
we augment this model with the decisions concerning optimal tax reporting by a manager and
auditing by a tax enforcing agency. The interaction between the firm and the tax auditing agency
makes the value of the traded security depend on the tax report submitted by the firm’s manager.
We consider two cases: when the tax report is made public and therefore is used by the dealer
when setting the prices and when it is not. The manager is engaged in insider trading and can
trade securities of his own firm using the information he has at his disposal. As the tax report
aﬀects both the value of the firm and the security prices in the financial market, the manager
faces a trade-oﬀ between increasing the value of the firm and increasing the price at which he
trades in the financial markets. Thus, the tax report, which is determined endogenously by that
trade-oﬀ, is used as a public signal when it is disclosed to the other market participants.
We consider a firm which owns a project with an uncertain payoﬀ or net cash flow e We
assume, without loss of generality, that the payoﬀ is equal to one,  = 1 if the project turns out
to be successful, which occurs with the exogenous probability . If the project fails, the payoﬀ
is  = 0, which occurs with probability 1 − . The manager perfectly observes the realization
of the payoﬀ associated with the project. When the project is successful, the manager can be
either honest with probability  and report the true value of the project to the tax agency, i.e.,
he declares  = 1 where  is the reported value sent to the tax authority; or he can be strategic
with probability 1 − . When the manager is strategic, he chooses to report truthfully with
probability  (he declares  = 1), and lies with probability 1−  (he declares  = 0), where  is
chosen optimally by the manager. Thus, we allow the manager to use a mixed strategy. When
the payoﬀ is  = 0 the manager only can declare the truth,  = 0, since due to limited liability
the firm has no funds to make any tax payment.
The previous probability  of telling the truth when the project is successful is assumed to be
exogenous and it can be interpreted as a measure of the tax morale of the manager or a measure
of the eﬀectiveness of corporate governance rules in inducing honest behavior by the manager
concerning the fiscal duties. As we will see later on, the existence of a positive probability of
honest behavior implies that the disclosure of tax reports has always an ex-ante informative
content as it reveals the value of the firm that non-strategic managers observe.
If the manager reports a high outcome,  = 1, the tax auditing agency does not inspect the
firm as no additional revenues would arise from the audit. Otherwise, the tax agency inspects the
firm and in doing so it exerts the amount  of eﬀort When it inspects, the tax agency discovers
the truth with the probabilitybWe assume for simplicity thatb is an increasing linear function of
8
the amount of eﬀort exerted by the tax agency, b =  After the eventual inspection takes place,
the firm pays the corresponding taxes and penalties. We assume that the tax law establishes
a flat tax rate  ∈ (0 1) on the firm net cash flow. The penalty paid by the firm in case the
manager misreports and is caught is  where the flat penalty rate  satisfies   1 and  ≤ 1.
The latter inequality is imposed as a consequence of the assumed limited liability. Since the
probability of discovering the truth is b and the revenue collected from penalties is  we can
define the auditing intensity as  ≡ b ≤  ≤ 1. Thus, when the tax agency chooses the eﬀort
 it chooses the probability b of discovering the truth and the auditing intensity  = b = .
Therefore, choosing the eﬀort in order to maximize its expected net revenue is equivalent to
choosing the auditing intensity . Notice also that the auditing intensity depends on the eﬀort
devoted to discover the truth: the higher b the higher the eﬀort or the resources devoted to
auditing and therefore, the higher the costs. We assume that the auditing costs are quadratic in
the eﬀort  exerted by the tax agency and they are equal to 1
2
ˆ2 with ˆ  0. This cost function
is known by both the auditor and the firm’s manager. Since the probability of discovering the
truth is b =  and the auditing intensity is  = b we can rewrite the auditing costs as
1
2
ˆ2 = 1
2
bµb
¶2
=
1
2
bµ 
¶2
=
1
2
2
where we define  ≡ b
()2
 0, which is the relevant cost parameter of the auditing cost
function.
The tax agency receives the tax report and chooses the auditing intensity  based on the
information contained in the tax report. However, since the tax agency observes also the price of
the transactions in the financial market, it can also use this information when setting the auditing
intensity. Consequently, the auditing intensity depends on the tax report but also on the trading
in the financial market.
In the financial market there are two types of investors: an insider, which is the aforementioned
manager, and noise traders (or liquidity traders). The traders are only allowed to submit market
orders and they can trade a single unit of the asset so that the order size is thus restricted to
the set {−1 1}. Trade in the financial market occurs after the report has been submitted and
before taxes and potential penalties are paid. The liquidation value  of the asset traded in the
financial market is the net payoﬀ after taxes and penalties. It is important to stress the fact that
the firm’s true liquidation value is revealed after the inspection by the tax enforcement agency
has taken place. Therefore, if a firm reporting a low outcome was not penalized (because either
it was not inspected or the inspection did not detect the true cash flows) and its liquidation value
ends up involving a high outcome, the tax agency cannot impose any penalty on the firm. This
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may be due, for instance, because the legal inspection period has already expired or because the
final profits appear oﬀshore and cannot be tracked any longer by the tax enforcement agency.
The manager is assumed to be risk neutral and uses the information he possesses about the net
payoﬀ of the project to compute the expected liquidation value of the asset. The manager buys if
his expectation about  is higher than the ask price and sells if his expectation about  is lower
than the bid price. Notice that the report sent by the manager aﬀects the inspection decision of
the tax auditing agency and thus it also aﬀects the value  through two channels: the voluntarily
paid taxes and the potential penalty. Therefore, a strategic manager chooses the probability  of
reporting truthfully to maximize the expected profit from trading. If the manager is not strategic
(i.e., honest), he always reports the true payoﬀ.
Trading takes place through a risk-neutral dealer who faces competition from other market-
makers and therefore should make a zero expected profit in equilibrium. The dealer posts ask and
bid quotes,  and , using the information contained in the order flow  as well as the tax report
 submitted by the manager if this report becomes public information. We assume also that the
dealer cannot cross-subsidize buys with sells or vice versa and thus we can consider buys and sells
separately. When a trader buys (trades at the dealer ask price), the dealer’s realized profit on the
trade is −  and, when the trader sells, the dealer’s profit on the trade is  −. In order to
avoid the problem of information revelation, we assume that traders arriving in the market are
drawn randomly from the population and that the probability that the manager is selected to
trade is . After the traders are randomly selected for trading and the dealer provides bid and ask
quotes, the traders choose the direction of trade. The behavior of noise traders is independent of
any information in the market and their trading decisions are motivated by exogenous liquidity
reasons (portfolio diversification, transitory shocks, etc.). We assume that noise traders buy and
sell a unit of the asset randomly with equal probability. The manager trades using instead his
information about the payoﬀ of the project. Therefore the higher , the lower the amount of noise
in the financial market is. Obviously if the payoﬀ of the project is  = 0, the manager sells at
the bid price, which is larger than the liquidation value expected by the manager due to all the
noise introduced in the market arising from the noise traders and the noisy tax reporting process.
In this case, the demand  for the asset by the manager is equal to −1. Otherwise, when the
payoﬀ is  = 1, he buys at the ask price oﬀered by the dealer, which for the same reasons is lower
than the liquidation value expected by the manager. In this latter case, we have  = 1 Thus,
the profit made by the manager when he buys is  −, and when he sells is  −  . The trader
selected to trade with the dealer is obliged to trade, i.e., no-trade is not allowed. Finally, if the
manager is not selected to trade, then his demand is simply  = 0. The event tree for trade in
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the financial market is represented in Figure 1.
The tax agency is risk neutral and chooses the auditing intensity  to maximize the expected
total net revenue  conditional on the manager’s report and the price of the asset. The auditing
is contingent therefore upon the report observed by the tax agency  and the direction of trade
in the financial market. The event three for the tax agency is represented in Figure 2.
If the payoﬀ of the project is high,  = 1, and the manager reports correctly,  = 1, the tax
agency does not inspect and its revenue in this case is equal to  . Notice that this can happen
in two cases: when the payoﬀ is high and the manager is honest and when the payoﬀ is also
high and the manager is strategic but he chooses to report truthfully  = 1 In case the manager
reports  = 0, the tax agency audits with intensity (1) when it observes a transaction at an ask
price, i.e., when the the trader buys, and  (−1) when it observes a transaction at a bid price, i.e.,
when the trader sells. In these cases the firm pays the penalty because the tax agency discovers
that the payoﬀ of the project undertaken by the firm was  = 1 but the manager reported  = 0.
Finally, if the report is  = 0 but also the payoﬀ of the project is 0, the tax agency audits also
with intensity either  (1) or  (−1) depending on the direction of the trade. However, since the
outcome of the project was indeed low, the tax agency ends up facing the auditing cost but not
collecting any penalty. As a result, the expected net revenue of the tax agency when  = 0 and
it observes a buy ( = 1) is
(|  = 0  = 1) =  (1) ( = 1|  = 0  = 1)− 1
2
 ( (1))2 
where  (|  ) is the probability of the project payoﬀ conditional both on the report and on the
direction of trade (or, equivalently, on the price at which the transaction takes place). Recall also
that the auditing intensity is  () = b ()  so that the expected revenue arises from multiplying
the expected payoﬀ of the project  (|  )  the probability b () of discovering the truth by the
tax enforcement agency, and the total penalty  per unit evaded.
The first-order condition for the problem of expected revenue maximization when  = 0 and
 = 1 is
 ( = 1|  = 0  = 1)−  (1) = 0
and the optimal auditing intensity (1) is thus
 (1) =  ( = 1|  = 0  = 1)  (1)
The second-order condition for this problem is   0 which is satisfied by assumption. Similarly,
the tax agency chooses the auditing intensity  (−1) to maximize the expected net revenue when
 = 0 and it observes a sell,  = −1 In this case, we have
 (−1) =  ( = 1|  = 0  = −1)  (2)
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Notice that both auditing intensities have to satisfy the additional constraint of being smaller
or equal than  ≤ 1 since  () = b ()  and b () is the probability of discovering the truth by
the auditors, which lies in the interval [0 1]. Note that if the auditing cost  is suﬃciently small
this constraint is binding and the auditing intensity becomes equal to  
We thus summarize the timing of the model as follows:
1. The nature draws the realization of the project’s payoﬀ  The project is successful with
probability 
2. The manager observes his private information about the firm’s payoﬀ and the nature chooses
whether the manager is honest (which occurs with probability ) or strategic. In case the
manager is strategic, he chooses the probability  of reporting truthfully.
3. Agents trade in the financial market.
4. The tax agency chooses, conditional on the tax report and the price of the firm in the stock
market, the auditing intensity  so as to maximize the expected net revenue  collected
from taxpayers.
2.1 Disclosure of the Tax Report
Let us consider in this section the case where the tax report is made public by the tax agency.
As the manager’s tax report aﬀects the intensity of the auditing by the tax agency, there are
always two channels through which the report aﬀects the net payoﬀ of the firm. The first direct
channel is associated with the voluntary payment of taxes corresponding to the tax report. The
second channel arises from the link between the tax report and the inspection decision of the
tax agency. Moreover, when the tax report is made public, there is a third channel aﬀecting the
manager’s profits. This third channel is associated with the eﬀect that the public tax report has
on the pricing strategies of the dealer. Since the manager trades in the financial market so as
to maximize the diﬀerence between the liquidation value of the firm (which is the payoﬀ of the
project net of taxes and penalties) and the price of the asset, he has to take into account these
three eﬀects when deciding his tax report.
Similarly to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the dealer sets prices so that his expected profit is
zero, which means that the potential gains by the uninformed are always compensated by the
losses incurred by the informed trader and vice versa. Notice, however, that when the tax report
is made public the dealer has an additional piece of information and he posts two ask prices and
two bid prices depending on the realization of the tax report  Thus, for a buy order and a high
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tax report the ask price equals
(1) ≡ ( = 1) =  [ |  = 1 and  = 1] 
while for a buy order and a low report the ask price is
(0) ≡ ( = 0) =  [ |  = 1 and  = 0] 
Similarly the bid price for a high report is
(1) ≡ ( = 1) =  [ |  = −1 and  = 1] 
while for a sell order and a low report the bid price is
(0) ≡ ( = 0) =  [ |  = −1 and  = 0] 
To calculate the above prices, i.e. the conditional expectations, we need to find the corresponding
conditional probabilities by using Bayes’ rule. These prices depend on the probability of reporting
truthfully chosen by the manager to maximize his expected profit from trading.
As we have mentioned above, the profit made by the manager is the liquidation value  minus
the ask price, when he buys, and the bid price minus the liquidation value  when he sells. As
it can be seen from the event tree in Figure 1, the manager buys whenever  = 1 and sells when
 = 0. Therefore, when the tax report is disclosed, we can write the expected profit  [Π] of
the manager as a function of the probability  of truthful reporting,
 [Π ()] =  { (1−) (1− ) ([1−  (1)]− (0)) + (1− ) (0)} 
We use the subindex  to denote the disclosure case, i.e., the case when the tax report is made
public, so that Π and  denote the profit and the auditing intensity in the disclosure case. Note
that the term (1−  (1))− (0) is the diﬀerence between the expected liquidation value and the
price at which the manager buys in case the project is successful, which occurs with probability 
he is strategic, which occurs with probability 1−, he misreports, which occurs with probability
1− , and he is selected to trade, which occurs with probability . Moreover in case the project
is unsuccessful and the manager is selected to trade, which occurs with probability (1− ), the
manager sells at the price  (0) an asset having zero value. Note that when the manager is not
selected to trade or when the project is successful but he is not strategic or he tells the truth
even if he is strategic, then the manager obtains zero profits from trading.
The optimal probability of reporting truthfully chosen by the manager is
 = argmax  [Π ()] 
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In equilibrium, we obtain that  = 0 because always [1−  (1)]− (0)  0, i.e., the liquidation
value of the asset in the case the strategic manager wants to buy is higher than the ask price (as
can be seen from the expression (3) below for  (0)). Obviously, when the tax report is disclosed,
the manager tends to be dishonest as the only profits he can obtain as a result of tax planning
appear when the report is  = 0. However, tax dishonesty comes at the price of lower liquidation
value due to the potential fines and higher ask and bid prices, which results in a lower profit for
the manager at every trade.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the disclosure case:
Proposition 1 The optimal ask and bid prices quoted by the dealer when the tax report is
disclosed are
(0) = [1−  (1)]  (1−) (1 + ) (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )  (3)
(1) = 1−  
(0) = [1−  (−1)]  (1−) (1− ) (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + ) 
(1) = 1−  
The equilibrium probability of telling the truth by a strategic manager when the project is successful
is  = 0
The optimal auditing intensities set by the tax agency are
 (1) =
1

∙
 (1−) (1 + )
 (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸
 (4)
 (−1) =
1

∙
 (1−) (1− )
 (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )
¸
 (5)
Notice that the auditing intensities chosen by the tax agency,  (1) and  (−1) defined in
(4) and (5), respectively, decrease with the auditing cost . Thus, as expected, the higher the
auditing cost, the lower the auditing intensity.
The auditing intensities depend also on the probability  of having a trade initiated by an
informed trader. As the probability  of the manager being selected to trade increases, the amount
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of noise in the market decreases and it becomes easier for the tax agency (and the market maker)
to disentangle the trades of the manager from the ones of the noise traders. Consequently, when
it sees a buy, the tax agency estimates that it is more likely to be the manager who traded based
on his information about the payoﬀ and therefore it inspects more often, i.e.,  (1) increases with
. Similarly, when it observes a sell, the tax agency attributes a higher probability of the trade
pertaining to noise traders and therefore  (−1) decreases with the probability  of the manager
being selected to trade.
2.2 No Disclosure of the Tax Report
We consider next the setup in which the tax report is not made public and, therefore, the market
maker sets the prices without conditioning on the value of the tax report, but still conditioning
on the order flow he receives. Thus the ask and bid price in this case are
 =  [ |  = 1] and  =  [ |  = −1] 
Similarly to the disclosure case the manager makes profits from trading when he buys (the
liquidation value minus the ask price) and when he sells (the bid price minus the liquidation
value). As in the disclosure case, the manager makes a profit from buying when the payoﬀ is
 = 1 and he is strategic and misreports. In this case the liquidation value equals to 1−  (1) 
where  (1) is the auditing intensity in the no-disclosure regime and is given by (1). Note that
since prices become public information after trade occurs, the tax agency still conditions on the
direction of trade as in the disclosure case. However, in the no-disclosure case, since the market
maker does not condition on the report, the manager makes also a profit in the case the payoﬀ is
 = 1 and the manager is honest or he is strategic but decides to report truthfully. In these two
cases the liquidation value is 1−   As a result, the expected profit of the manager equals to
 [Π ()] =  { (1− ) (1−) ([1−  (1)]−)
+ [ (1−) +] (1−  −) + (1− )} 
The optimal probability of reporting truthfully chosen by the manager in the no-disclosure
regime is therefore
 = argmax  [Π()] 
From the first-order condition with respect to  we obtain three cases. If the auditing intensity
chosen by the tax agency is such that  (1) =  then the strategic manager is indiﬀerent between
telling the truth and cheating in his tax report. The manager then chooses a mixed strategy
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Figure 3: Reaction functions of the manager (solid line) and the tax agency (dashed and dotted
lines).
concerning the probability of telling the truth whenever the market conditions allow him to do
so. However, if the auditing cost  is high or there is a low probability  of the manager being
selected to trade, then the auditing intensity satisfies  (1)   and the strategic manager
chooses  = 0, so he always submits a false report. If the auditing intensity is such that
 (1)   then the strategic manager chooses  = 1. Figure 3 shows the reaction functions
for the tax agency and for the manager. The reaction function of the manager is the solid line.
The reaction function for the tax agency is the dotted line if the auditing cost is very large and,
thus, in equilibrium  (1)   and the manager always cheats ( = 0) or it is the dashed
line if the auditing cost is not so high and, thus, the manager chooses an interior value for the
probability of true reporting while the agency selects the auditing intensity  (1) =   Note
that the auditing intensity selected by the tax agency decreases with the probability of a truthful
report since a low value of  results in a larger expected revenue from penalties on evaded
profits accruing from the inspection.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the no-disclosure regime. We use
the subindex  to denote the case where the tax report is not disclosed.
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Proposition 2 The optimal ask and bid prices quoted by the dealer when the tax report is not
disclosed are
 =
(1 + )  {[1−  (1)] (1−) + (1− )}
(1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) 
 =
(1− )  {[1−  (−1)] (1− ) (1−) + (1− ) ( (1−) +)}
(1− ) + (1 + ) (1− ) 
The equilibrium probability of telling the truth of the strategic manager is
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸
if 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸
 1
0 otherwise.
(6)
The auditing intensities are
 (1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 if   0
1

∙
 (1−) (1 + )
 (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸
if  = 0
(7)
 (−1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (1− )
(1 + )
∙
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )
¸
if   0
1

∙
 (1−) (1− )
 (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )
¸
if  = 0
(8)
Note from (6) that for high values of  the probability of telling the truth is high as the
manager puts more weight on the potential gains from trading in the financial market than from
tax evasion. Moreover, for low values of the auditing cost , the strategic manager tends to lie
less as in this case the audit intensity exerted by the tax authority is higher. However, despite of
the fact that the manager plays a mixed reporting strategy, the tax agency and the market maker
together are able to undo the eﬀect of his mixed strategy and the maximum expected profit he
makes when he buys does not depend on  and is just equal to  (1−  −). Therefore,
his incentives for tax planning are smaller as this activity increases his profits only through the
uncertainty that introduces in the financial market, which is embedded in asset prices but not in
the likelihood of getting these profits.
Notice that   0 implies that  (1)   (1) and  (−1)   (−1) for all values of
the parameters of the model. When  = 0 tax reports are totally non-informative so that the
auditing intensities are obviously equal in the disclosure and in the no-disclosure regimes. As it
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can be seen from (7) in the case where the manager chooses   0 the auditing intensity in
case of observing a buy does not depend on the other parameters of the model. However, the
auditing intensity in the case of observing a sell given in (8) does depend on the amount of noise
trading. The tax agency can in this case inspect less when the noise in the market is low because
it can infer now that it is more unlikely to face a strategic informed trader who sells. However,
the auditing intensity in this case does not depend on the ineﬃciency arising from the auditing
cost .
2.3 The Performance of the Financial Market
In this subsection, we consider two indicators of performance of the financial market: the bid-ask
spreads and the insider’s expected profits. Note that the bid-ask spread measures the liquidity (or
depth) of the market since a large spread means that prices are very sensitive to the direction of
trade so that buyers end up paying a large price while sellers end up getting a low price. Obviously,
a large spread is detrimental for the noise traders as their expected cost of trading becomes also
large. Once we have determined the optimal reporting strategy of a strategic manager, we proceed
first to calculate the expected bid-ask spread and the expected profit of the manager. These two
market indicators are characterized in the following corollary:
Corollary 3 (a) The expected spread and the manager’s expected profit when the tax report is
disclosed are
 () =
∙
[1−  (1)] (1 + )
(1−)  (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) −
[1−  (−1)] (1− )
(1−)  (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )
¸
× (1−)  [(1−) + (1− )] 
 (Π) =  {(1−)  [(1−  (1))− (0)] + (1− )(0)} 
(b) The spread and the manager’s expected profit when the tax report is not disclosed are
 =  −
 (Π) =  [ (1−  −) + (1− )] 
where  (1)   (−1)   (0)  (0)  and  are defined in the previous Propositions 1
and 2.
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2.4 The Tax Agency’s Expected Revenue
In this subsection we provide the expected net revenue collected by the tax agency. We consider
all the components of the tax revenue, that is, voluntarily paid taxes plus penalties net of auditing
costs. From Propositions 1 and 2 we can find the expected net revenues collected by the agency,
which are given in the next corollary:
Corollary 4 The expected net revenue of the tax agency when the tax report is disclosed is
 () =  +
[(1−)  (1 + )]2
4 [(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )]
+
[(1−)  (1− )]2
4 [(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )] 
and the expected net revenue of the tax agency when the tax report is not disclosed is
 () = [+  (1−)]  +
[(1− ) (1−)  (1 + )]2
4 [(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )]
+
[(1− ) (1−)  (1− )]2
4 [(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )] 
where  is defined in Proposition 2.
In the next section we will make explicit the trade-oﬀ between market performance and
expected net revenues raised by the tax agency. In particular, if a revenue maximizing tax agency
has to decide whether to make public the tax reports or not, it might select a non-disclosure policy
in spite of being detrimental for the performance of financial market. However, depending on the
parameter values of the model, disclosure could be optimal from the tax agency viewpoint so that
in this case the maximization of expected net tax revenues is compatible with a better functioning
of the financial market.
3 Endogenous Disclosure of Tax Reports
The tax report sent by the firm to the tax enforcing agency is an endogenous signal about the
state of the nature faced by the firm. This signal can be disclosed by the tax enforcement agency
and, thus, used by the market maker in order to make a better prediction about the firm’s value
when setting the price. Moreover, if the report is made public then the insider’s trading strategy
is aﬀected accordingly. To understand the eﬀect of public disclosure of the tax report signal, we
compare the market performance and the tax agency’s expected net revenue in two economies
with and without the tax report being disclosed.
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Figure 4: Spread Comparison. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 05  = 03
3.1 Market Performance Comparison
As before, we consider two measures of market performance: market liquidity and expected profit
of the insider trader. As explained above, we measure market liquidity using the expected bid-ask
spread. We find that in the disclosure case, the ask price is lower the bid price is higher than
in the no-disclosure case. Obviously, the disclosure of the tax reports results in a reduction in
the degree of asymmetric information between the insider and the market maker and, thus, the
market maker lowers the spread, which is the instrument he uses to protect himself against bad
trades with the insider. Note that even if the insider always cheats under tax report disclosure,
there is a probability  of having an honest manager reporting the true cash flow of the firm and,
thus, the publicly released tax report has a relevant informative content. Therefore, as expected,
when more information is disclosed the market maker sets a expected spread that is lower than
the spread when there is no disclosure (see Figure 4 for a spread comparison under a particular
parametric example).
Note that, if there were no honest managers in the economy ( = 0) the disclosure of the tax
reports would not contain information about the firm’s value. However, this does not imply that
the spreads under disclosure and no disclosure coincide when  = 0 This is so because under no
disclosure the tax agency inspects more intensively the firm if a transaction occurs at the ask price
(i.e., if the trader buys) as this raises the probability of a high payoﬀ and, thus, a larger expected
revenue would arise from the inspection. This more intensive auditing results in a lower expected
net value for the firm and, thus, the market maker anticipates this by lowering the posted ask
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Figure 5: Spread Comparison. Parameter Values:  = 0  = 05  = 05  = 03
price. This means that the expected bid-ask spread becomes smaller under disclosure even if the
tax reports are completely uninformative. In Figure 5 we illustrate the spread comparison when
 = 0 and we see that the expected spread under disclosure is smaller than the spread under no
disclosure when the auditing cost  faced by the tax enforcement agency is small and, thus, the
manager chooses a positive probability  of reporting a high profit. Obviously, when the value
 of the auditing cost is suﬃciently high then the manager always reports a low profit and then
the spreads under disclosure and no disclosure coincide.
We obtain a similar situation when we compare the manager’s expected profit from trading
in the disclosure regime and in the no-disclosure regime: the expected profit is higher under no
disclosure. This is due to the fact that in the no-disclosure regime, when the manager chooses the
report endogenously, he is able to hide better his inside information than in the disclosure regime.
Thus, it is more diﬃcult for the market maker to disentangle the manager’s order from that of
a noise trader in the case where the tax report is not disclosed and, consequently, the manager’s
expected profit is higher in the no-disclosure case. Notice that, since the expected profit of the
manager is higher in the no-disclosure case, the trading costs (i.e., the expected profit of the noise
traders) are lower in this case. Therefore, policymakers may conclude that the disclosure of the
tax report is beneficial for market performance because it reduces both the spread and trading
costs. Figures 6 and 7 display the expected profits of the manager for the cases where there is a
positive fraction of honest taxpayers (  0) and when all the taxpayers are strategic ( = 0)
respectively.
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Figure 6: Comparison of manager’s expected profits. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05
 = 05  = 03
3.2 Expected Tax Revenue Comparison
We are now interested in analyzing whether disclosure of the tax report is also beneficial for the
tax agency from the point of view of the expected net revenues that it can collect. The following
corollary tells us that, when the tax report is disclosed, the reporting strategy of the manager is
aﬀected in such a way that the eﬀect on expected net tax collection is ambiguous.
Corollary 5 The expected net tax revenue collected by the tax agency may be smaller or larger
when the tax report is disclosed than when the tax report is not disclosed. In particular, there
exist two values of the auditing cost   and  such that  () =  () for  ≥ ,  () 
 () for  ∈ ( )  and  ()   () for   
As the Figure 8 illustrates, when the auditing cost  is very large, the manager in the no-
disclosure regime never tells the truth,  = 0We consider the case of the auditing cost but the
discussion regarding the other parameters is very similar. Notice that when the probability  of
informed trading is small the manager in the no-disclosure regime never tells the truth ( = 0)
and the proof is similar. Let us define
 ≡ 1
∙
 (1−) (1 + )
 (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸

such that for any   ,   0 and for any  ≥   = 0 as it follows from (6). As explained
above, the expected net return of the tax agency has two components: the taxes voluntarily paid
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Figure 7: Comparison of manager’s expected profits. Parameter Values:  = 0  = 05  = 05
 = 03
arising from the tax report and the penalties net of auditing cost collected in case of inspection.
Notice that the taxes voluntarily paid increase with the probability  of telling the truth when
the manager is strategic, while the penalties decrease with  Note also that for  ≥  there is no
diﬀerence between the disclosure and the no-disclosure regimes concerning the strategy followed
by the strategic manager, as he always misreports,  = 0. However, when the auditing cost
 becomes slightly smaller than , the manager starts telling the truth with positive probability
under the no-disclosure regime whereas he keeps misreporting under disclosure. Therefore, the
positive direct eﬀect on voluntary tax collection results in larger expected net revenues for the
tax authority. In this case, the tax agency does not have incentives to disclose the tax report.
However, notice that when the auditing cost is very small (or the manager’s probability  of being
selected to trade is very high) the tax agency prefers to disclose the signal. For instance, if the
value of the auditing cost  is very low then the tax agency can audit almost all the low reports
(the ones with  = 0). In this case, under no disclosure the manager always tells the truth as
 converges to 1 as  approaches zero so that the expected tax revenue converges to  , which
is the maximum amount of tax that can be collected under universal truth-telling. However,
under disclosure, the manager always reports  = 0 and, if all those reports are audited, then the
expected tax revenue becomes+(1−) where the first term of the sum are the taxes paid
by the honest manager and the second are the fines paid by the strategic manager. Since   1,
the expected tax revenue is higher when the tax report is disclosed. Consequently, depending on
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Figure 8: Expected Tax Revenue. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 05  = 03
the parameter values characterizing our economy, it might or might not be beneficial for the tax
agency to disclose the tax report.
4 The Eﬀects of Auditing Cost and Uncertainty on Market
Performance and Tax Agency Revenue
To understand the performance of the financial markets and the expected tax revenue, we will
perform in this section a comparative statics exercise with respect to the ineﬃciency of the tax
enforcement agency, measured by the value  of the auditing cost and the lack of noise of the
market, measured by probability  of the manager being selected to trade.
4.1 The Eﬀect of Auditing Cost on Market Performance
First, we analyze how the auditing cost aﬀects market performance. Notice first that, in the case
where the tax report is disclosed, for small values of the auditing cost , and when the market
maker observes  = 0 he sets an ask price lower than the bid price. This is due to the fact that
for small values of the auditing cost, it is not costly to inspect and hence the auditing intensity
might reach its maximum value  . Thus, there exist two values of the auditing cost, − and +
with −  +, such that for any   − we have (−1) =  and for any   + we have that
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Figure 9: Ask and Bid Prices. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 05  = 03
(1) =   Therefore, there exists a value of the auditing cost
∗ ≡
2 (1−)
¡
1− + 2 (1− − )
¢
((1−)  (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )) ((1−)  (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )) ∈ (+ 1) 
such that for  ≥ ∗ the market maker sets an ask price  (0)   (0)  From now on we consider
in our analysis only the cases where  ≥ ∗ so as to ensure that the ask price is higher than the
bid price.
We showed above that, under public disclosure, the relationship between the auditing
intensities (1) and  (−1) and the auditing cost  is monotonically decreasing. However, if the
tax report is not publicly disclosed and   0 then the auditing intensities (1) and  (−1)
do not depend on the auditing cost  while, if  = 0, then the auditing intensities (1) and
 (−1) decrease with . Notice that the auditing cost does not aﬀect the expectations of the
market maker about trading against the manager but they do aﬀect the expected liquidation
value of the asset to be traded in the financial market through the auditing intensity. In the
case where the report is disclosed, when the market maker observes a sell or a buy together with
 = 0 the liquidation value of the firm depends negatively on  (1) and  (−1), respectively.
Moreover, since these auditing intensities both decrease with  it results that both the ask price
 (0) and  (0) increase with the auditing cost  (see Figure 9, Panel A). Thus, the ineﬃciency
of the tax agency is transmitted to the financial market and the spread becomes wider as the
auditing cost increases. Since if  = 1 the market maker knows for sure that he trades against the
informed manger, he sets the ask price equal to the bid price and equal to the expected value of
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Figure 10: Spreads. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 05  = 03
the firm 1−  As the probability of observing a low report, 0 ≡ Pr( = 0) = (1−) +(1− ),
does not depend on the auditing cost, the expected ask and bid price have a similar behavior as
the ask and bid price in the case  = 0 when the auditing cost varies (see Figure 9, Panel B). The
same eﬀect is found when  = 0 in the no-disclosure regime (see Figure 9, Panel C). However,
when   0 the auditing intensities do not depend on the auditing cost and therefore neither
the liquidation value does. When the market maker observes a buy, he understands that the
expected liquidation value is the same in the case of paying taxes honestly and when the manager
is strategic, reports  = 0 and he is inspected by the tax enforcement agency, i.e., the liquidation
value is equal to 1−  as follows from the fact that  (1) =  . Hence, the probability of telling
the truth does not aﬀect the expectation of the market maker when he observes a buy and this
implies that the ask price in this case does not depend on the auditing cost. However, since
 (−1)   if the market maker receives a sell order he understands that it is more likely that
the order comes from a noise trader than from a strategic manager reporting  = 0. Since this
happens with the probability 1 −  and  decreases monotonically with  it results that
the bid price increases with the auditing cost . Notice that, if the value of the auditing cost
reaches the level
∗∗ ≡ 1
∙
(1−)  (1 + )
(1−)  (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸

then for any  ≥ ∗∗ we have that  = 0 and, therefore, the behavior of the spread is similar
under disclosure.
Notice that in the disclosure regime when  increases, it is more costly for the tax auditing
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Figure 11: Manager’s Expected Profit. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 05  = 03
agency to monitor, the manager chooses to report  = 0, and therefore this report is less
informative for the market maker. Consequently, when  increases it is more diﬃcult for the
market maker to disentangle the noise traders from the insider manager and therefore he sets a
higher spread (see Figure 10, Panel A). In the case  = 1 the market maker sets the ask price
equal to the bid price and, therefore, the spread is always 0. As a result, the expected spread
equals the spread when  = 0 multiplied by the probability 0 of having a low tax report and it
has the same behavior as the spread arising in the case  = 0 (see Figure 10, Panel B). Therefore,
one testable implications of our model is that economies with ineﬃcient tax auditing systems
(i.e., with large values of ) will tend to exhibit larger spreads in their financial market when the
firms’ tax reports are publicly disclosed.
However, in the no-disclosure regime, we have non-monotonicity of the spread with respect to
the auditing cost. Thus for any  ∈ (∗ ∗∗), the ask price is constant and the bid price increases
with the auditing cost , and this implies that the bid-ask spread decreases. However, when 
becomes larger than ∗∗, we are in a situation similar to the disclosure case as the tax agency is
ineﬃcient and, thus, the optimal strategy of the manager is to misreport always,  = 0. The
market maker understands that the tax agency is ineﬃcient, the manager can misreport more
often, and in this case he is more likely to trade against the informed trader. Therefore, the
market maker sets a wider bid-ask spread. Since the ask price increases faster than the bid price
with the auditing cost, we observe that the spread increases (see Figure 10, Panel C).
Finally, we obtain that the expected profit of the manager increases with the auditing cost both
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under disclosure and under no disclosure (see Figure 11). In the disclosure regime higher auditing
cost increases the expected profit of the manager because the profit from trading increases with the
auditing cost  both when the manager is strategic and declares  = 0 (since (1−  (1))− (0) is
a decreasing function of  (1)) and when the manager is honest and sells (as  (0) increases with
the auditing cost). In the no-disclosure regime, despite the fact that the spread is U-shaped, we
find that the expected profit of the manager increases with the auditing cost. The bid increases
with the auditing cost and therefore the profit when the manager sells increases. However, the
market maker is able to cancel out any ineﬃciency introduced by the cost of auditing if the
manager buys and the auditing cost is small. Therefore, in this case the profit of the manager
does not depend on the auditing cost. When the auditing cost is high, the manager is able to
introduce noise by misreporting and he trades very aggressively on his private information in the
financial market.
4.2 The Eﬀect of Market Noise on Market Performance
We next study how the amount of noise in the market aﬀects the performance of the financial
market. In their seminal paper, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) analyzed the relationship between
the size of the bid-ask spread and the amount of noise in the market. They found that, as the
noise of the market decreases (i.e., the probability of the insider trader being selected to trade
increases), the size of the spread set by the market maker increases as this allows him to partially
protect himself against bad trades with the insider. As we will see next, in our model where the
insider interacts with the tax enforcement agency, that monotonic relationship between amount
of market noise and spread does not longer holds when the tax report is publicly disclosed.
The less noise there is in the market (i.e. the higher the probability  is), the more often the
informed trader is selected to trade. Therefore, the market maker’s expectations about facing
the manager when trading always increase with . In the disclosure regime, the tax agency
understands that when it sees a buy order it is more likely that the firm is good and that the
order to buy comes from the informed manager and therefore it increases its auditing intensity
 (1)  Similarly, when it sees a low report  = 0 and a sell, it infers that it is more likely to have a
bad firm and an order coming from a noise trader so that its auditing intensity  (−1) decreases
with  The dealer also understands this and wants to set higher ask prices and lower bid prices
in the case of a low report,  = 0. However, the liquidation value of the firm when  = 0 decreases
with  due to the higher expected penalties faced by the manager. Therefore, concerning the ask
price, the market maker faces a trade-oﬀ between lower liquidation value and higher probability
of trading against the manager. Consequently, unlike in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the ask
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Figure 12: Ask and Bid Prices. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 12  = 03
price  (0) has an inverted U-shape with respect to  (see Figure 12, Panel A). Since the ask price
when  = 1 and the probability of having a low report  = 0 do not depend on , the expected
ask has a similar shape (see Figure 12, Panel B). In the no-disclosure regime, the ask price is
only exposed to the first eﬀect, because, independently of which are the parameters values, the
liquidation value is equal to 1−  , which does not depend on  Therefore, in this case, as in the
original Glosten-Milgrom model, the ask price increases with  and the bid price decreases with
 since the market maker expects to trade more often against the informed manager (see Figure
12, Panel C). When we analyze the spread, in both regimes the market maker’s expectations of
facing the manager when buying increases faster than the market maker’s expectations of facing
the manager when selling. However, in the disclosure regime, as  becomes larger we find the
same trade-oﬀ in the spread since the bid always decreases with  and the ask price increases
initially faster but eventually decreases (see Figure 13).
We can also analyze how the insider’s expected profit changes when the noise trading varies.
We obtain that the expected profit in both the disclosure and the no-disclosure regime has an
inverted U-shape with respect to , which is similar to the comparative statics arising in the
original Glosten-Milgrom model (see Figure 14). This is so because of the trade-oﬀ faced by the
manager: the higher , the higher are his chances of being selected to trade but also the lower
his profit in each instance of trading because the market maker can more easily understand that
his order is informed. This trade-oﬀ applies even when we introduce the strategic interaction
between the manager and the tax enforcement agency.
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Figure 13: Spreads. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 12  = 03
4.3 The Eﬀects of Auditing Cost and Noise Trading on the Tax Agency’s
Expected Revenue
In the next corollary we perform the corresponding comparative statics for the expected net
revenue of the tax agency with respect to the parameter values of the model:
Corollary 6 (i) The tax agency’s expected net revenue, both in the disclosure and in the no-
disclosure regime, decreases with the auditing cost, 
(ii) The tax agency’s expected net revenue, both in the disclosure and in the no-disclosure
regime, increases with the probability  of informed trading
In the disclosure regime, the expected net revenue of the tax agency is aﬀected by changes
in the auditing cost only through the collected penalties as the taxes voluntarily paid do not
depend on . Therefore, since the auditing intensities  (1) and  (−1) both decrease with ,
the total net tax revenue collected in case of inspection decreases with  so that the total expected
net revenue decreases with . However, in the no-disclosure case, we have a trade-oﬀ. On the
one hand, the higher the auditing cost, the lower the probability  of the manager telling
the truth and, thus, the lower the expected revenue collected by the tax agency from voluntarily
reported taxes. On the other hand, the higher auditing cost, the higher the amount the tax
agency collects from penalties, since the probability of collecting penalties increases with the
auditing cost. However, this last eﬀect does not dominate the negative direct eﬀect on voluntary
tax collection and, therefore, we also find in this case that the expected tax net revenue decreases
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Figure 14: Manager’s Expected Profit. Parameter Values:  = 05  = 05  = 12  = 03
with the auditing cost.
When we study how the expected tax net revenue changes when the probability of informed
trading , changes, we also see that, in the disclosure case, this change only has an eﬀect through
the amount of penalties collected and not through the taxes honestly paid. In this case, the
auditing intensities  (1) and  (−1) increase and decrease, respectively, with  However, since
they enter quadratically in the calculations of the penalties, they do not drive the behavior of
the expected tax revenue. What drives this behavior are the probabilities of collecting these
penalties, i.e., how often the manager is inspected and caught. As explained above, we have two
situations when this can happen. The probability of tax agency observing a low report  = 0 and
a buy is  ( = 0  = 1) = 1
2
((1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )), and this probability increases
with the probability of the manager being selected to trade, . This is so because the tax agency
believes is more likely to face an informed trader when the firm is good and  = 1. Similarly,
when the tax agency observes a low report  = 0 and a sell we have that the probability of this
event is  ( = 0  = −1) = 1
2
((1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )) and this probability decreases
with the probability  of the manager’s being selected to trade because the tax agency believes
that in the case of a bad firm it is more likely that the order to buy was placed by a noise trader).
However, since the intensity of auditing in the case of observing a buy is higher than the intensity
in the case of observing a sell,  (1)   (−1)  the penalties collected in the first case dominate
the eﬀect of the penalties in the second case. As a result, the expected net tax revenue if the tax
report is disclosed increases with . In the case where the tax report is not disclosed, both the
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penalties when observing a buy and a sell decrease with  because the higher the probability 
of the manager’s being selected to trade, the higher the probability  that the manager tells
the truth and, hence, the less often the manager pays these penalties. However, this decrease is
always oﬀset by the taxes voluntarily paid since these taxes increase with the probability  of
the manager telling the truth
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed an insider trading model that has allowed us to analyze how an
endogenous public signal resulting from the interaction between a firm and a tax auditing agency
may aﬀect trading in the financial market. We show that uncertainty regarding a firm’s payoﬀ
realization, together with the endogeneity arising during the reporting stage, has a sizeable impact
on the reporting strategy of the firm, the auditing policy of the tax agency, and the pricing policy
adopted by the dealer in the financial market. Thus, the disclosure of the tax report produced
by a firm, not only aﬀects the liquidation value of the firm but also brings about substantial
changes in the behavior of the market liquidity, the profits of the market participants, and the
informativeness of prices.
Our results are consistent with the empirical literature that shows that disclosure of
information is beneficial for market performance (Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).
However, it also implies that the tax agency might have incentives to not disclose the tax report
because that disclosure could result in a smaller net tax collection. In addition, our model
gives raise to some cross-country empirical implications about the disclosure of the tax report by
suggesting that in countries with less eﬃcient tax agencies the liquidity of the shares traded in
the financial markets is lower.
Another interesting implication of our model refers to the strategic choice made by the
manager. As we mentioned above, when the tax report is not disclosed the manager tends
to tell the truth more often since in this case the tax agency and the market maker can fully undo
the eﬀect of strategic behavior by the manager when he declares a low payoﬀ from the project.
However, in the case that the tax report is disclosed, it is optimal to cheat always.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the dealer cannot distinguish the
informed trader from liquidity traders and he must break even on average due to the assumed
risk neutrality and the Bertrand competition he faces. The novelty here is that when he posts
the ask and bid prices he observes now two signals. He observes the order flow so he can tell if it
is a buyer initiated trade or a seller initiated trade. The order flow  observed by the dealer can
take two values:  = −1 when it is a seller initiated trade or  = 1 when it is a buyer initiated
trade. In addition, he can observe the tax report, which has been publicly released. In order to
set the prices, the dealer computes the expected value of the asset conditional on the information
he has. For a buy order when the report is high,  = 1, the ask price is
(1) ≡ ( = 1) =  [ |  = 1 and  = 1] 
while for a buy order and low report,  = 0 the ask price is
(0) ≡ ( = 0) =  [ |  = 1 and  = 0] 
Similarly the bid price for high report,  = 1 is
(1) ≡ ( = 1) =  [ |  = −1 and  = 1] 
while for a sell order and low report,  = 0 the ask price is
(0) ≡ ( = 0) =  [ |  = −1 and  = 0] 
Using the event tree in Figure 1 and Bayes rule we calculate first the probabilities of each of
this state occurring, conditional on the two signals received by the dealer. Let b (1) and b (−1)
be the probabilities of discovering the truth when the tax authority observes a buy and a sell,
respectively. Then, the ask price when the tax report is high,  = 1 equals
(1) = 1 · Pr [ = 1| { = 1} ∩ { = 1}] +(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = 1} ∩ { = 1}])
+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = 1} ∩ { = 1}] + 0 · Pr  = 0| { = 1} ∩ { = 1} = 1−  
while the ask price when the tax report is low,  = 0 is
(0) = 1 · Pr [ = 1| { = 1} ∩ { = 0}] + (1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = 1} ∩ { = 0}]
+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = 1} ∩ { = 0}] + 0 · Pr [ = 0| { = 1} ∩ { = 0}]
=
[1−b (1)+b (1) (1− )] (1− ) (1−)  (1 + )
 (1− ) (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
=
[1−  (1)]  (1− ) (1−) (1 + )
 (1− ) (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) 
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where for the last equality we have used the fact that  = b  Similarly, for a sell order we have
two bid prices the bid in case of high report,  = 1
(1) = 1 · Pr [ = 1| { = −1} ∩ { = 1}] + (1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = −1} ∩ { = 1}]
+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = −1} ∩ { = 1}] +0·Pr [ = 0| { = −1} ∩ { = 1}] = 1−  
and the bid in case of low report,  = 0 is
(0) = 1 · Pr [ = 1| { = −1} ∩ { = 0}] + (1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = −1} ∩ { = 0}]
+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | { = 1} ∩ { = 1}] + 0 · Pr [ = 0| { = −1} ∩ { = 0}]
=
[1−b (−1)+b (1) (1− )] (1− ) (1−)  (1 + )
 (1− ) (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
=
[1−  (−1)]  (1− ) (1−) (1− )
 (1− ) (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + ) 
The expected profit of the manager under disclosure is
 [Π ()] =  {(1− ) (1−)  [[1−  (1)]− (0)] + (1− )(0)} 
The manager chooses the probability  to maximize the expected profit, and consequently, the
optimal probability of telling the truth is  = 0 since [1−  (1)] −  (0)  0 Therefore, the
prices set by the market maker in the regime with disclosure of the tax report are equal to
(0) = [1−  (1)]  (1−) (1 + ) (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) 
(1) = 1−  
(0) = [1−  (−1)]  (1−) (1− ) (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + ) 
(1) = 1−  
Finally, using (1) and (2), the equilibrium auditing intensities under disclosure are the following:
 (1) =
 ( = 1|  = 0  = 1)
 =
1

∙
 (1−) (1 + )
 (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸

 (−1) =
 ( = 1|  = 0  = −1)
 =
1

∙
 (1−) (1− )
 (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )
¸

40
Proof of Proposition 2. In the case where the market maker cannot see the tax report, he
sets prices conditioning only on the order flow that he observes. Consequently, the ask price is
 =  [ |  = 1] = 1 · Pr [ = 1|  = 1]+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | = 1]
+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | = 1]+0 · Pr [ = 0| = 1]
=
(1 + ) {[1−  (1)] (1− ) (1−) + (1− )  ( (1−) +)}
(1 + ) [(1− ) (1−) +  ( (1−) +)] + (1− ) (1− )
=
(1 + ) {[1−  (1)] (1− ) (1−) + (1− ) [ (1−) +] }
(1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )  (9)
Similarly, when the market maker observes a sell order he sets the price
 =  [ |  = −1] = 1 · Pr [ = 1|  = −1] + (1− ) Pr [ = 1−  |  = −1]
+(1− ) Pr [ = 1−  | = −1]+0·Pr [ = 0|  = −1] =
=
(1− ) {(1− ) (1−)  [1−  (−1)] + [ (1−) +]  (1− )}
(1− ) ((1− ) (1−) + ( (1−) +)) + (1 + ) (1− )
=
(1− ) {[1−  (−1)] (1− ) (1−) + (1− ) [ (1−) +] }
(1− ) + (1 + ) (1− )  (10)
The expected profit of the manager under no disclosure is
 [Π ()] =  { (1− ) (1−) ([1−  (1)]−) +  [ (1−) +] (1−  −) + (1− )} 
The first-order condition with respect to  in order to maximize  [Π ()] is
− (1−)  {[1−  (1)]−}+  (1−  −) = 0
so that  ∈ (0 1) if  (1) =   If  (1)   then the optimal probability of reporting the truth
under no disclosure is  = 1 whereas, if  (1)   the optimal probability becomes  = 0
Under no disclosure the auditing intensity when the trader buys is according to (1) equal to
 (1) =
1

∙
(1− ) (1−)  (1 + )
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )
¸
 (11)
and, if we make  (1) =  , we solve for the optimal value  of the probability of reporting high
profits by a strategic manager and we get
 = 1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸
 (12)
provided that  ∈ (0 1). Therefore, using (2) and the previous expression for , the auditing
intensity when the trader sells is in this case equal to
 (−1) =
1

∙
(1− ) (1−)  (1− )
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )
¸
=  (1− )
(1 + )
∙
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )
¸
 (13)
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Replacing the probability  and the auditing intensities  (1) and  (−1) in (9) and (10), by its
optimal values given (12) and (11) and (13), we get the following ask and bid prices:
 =
(1 + ) {(1−  (1)) (1− ) (1−) + (1− ) ( (1−) +) }
(1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
=
(1 + ) (1− ) 
(1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
and
 =
(1− )
(1− ) + (1 + ) (1− )
½µ
1−  (1− )
(1 + )
∙
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )
¸¶
×
×
µ
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¶
(1−) 
+(1− )
∙µ
1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸¶
(1−) +
¸

¾

Notice that, if  (1)   then 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸
 1 and, therefore, we have a
corner solution,  = 0. In this case, we have the following equilibrium prices:
 =
(1 + ) [1−  (1)] (1−) + (1− )
(1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) 
 =
(1− ) [1−  (−1)] (1−) + (1− )
(1− ) + (1 + ) (1− ) 
and the following auditing intensities in equilibrium:
 (1) =
1

∙
 (1−) (1 + )
 (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸

 (−1) =
1

∙
 (1−) (1− )
 (1−) (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )
¸

Proof of Corollary 3. We define the following probabilities
0 ≡ Pr( = 0) = (1− ) (1−) + (1− ) 
1 ≡ Pr( = 1) =  (1−) +
When  = 0 we have 0 = (1−) + (1− )  1 =  and, therefore, the expected prices are
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equal to
 () =  (0) 0 + (1) 1
=
[1−  (1)] (1−)  (1 + )
(1−)  (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) [(1−) + (1− )] + (1− )
 () =  (0) 0 + (1) 1
=
[1−  (−1)] (1−)  (1− )
(1−)  (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + ) [(1−) + (1− )] + (1− )
Therefore, the expected spread is
 () =  ()− () =
[1−  (1)] (1−)  (1 + )
(1−)  (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) [(1−) + (1− )]
+(1− )−
∙
[1−  (−1)] (1−)  (1− )
(1−)  (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + ) [(1−) + (1− )] + (1− )
¸
=
µ
[1−  (1)] (1 + )
(1−)  (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− ) −
[1−  (−1)] (1− )
(1−)  (1− ) + (1− ) (1 + )
¶

× (1−)  [(1−) + (1− )] 
Proof of Corollary 4. The expected revenue collected by the tax agency in the disclosure
regime is
 () =  ( = 1)  +  ( = 0  = 1)
( ( = 1|  = 0  = 1))2
2 +
+ ( = 0  = −1) ( ( = 1|  = 0  = −1))
2
2
=  + 1
4 [(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )]
∙
(1−)  (1 + )
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )
¸2
+
1
4 [(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )]
∙
(1−)  (1− )
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )
¸2
=  + 1
4
[(1−)  (1 + )]2
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− ) +
1
4
[(1−)  (1− )]2
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− ) 
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The expected revenue of the tax agency under no disclosure equals to
 () =  ( = 1)  +  ( = 0  = 1)
[ ( = 1|  = 0  = 1)]2
2 +
+  ( = 0  = −1) [ ( = 1|  = 0  = −1)]
2
2 = [+  (1−)]+
+
1
4 [(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )]
∙
(1− ) (1−)  (1 + )
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )
¸2
+
1
 [(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )]
∙
(1− ) (1−)  (1− )
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )
¸2
= [+  (1−)]  +
1
4
[(1− ) (1−)  (1 + )]2
(1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )+
+
1
4
[(1− ) (1−)  (1− )]2
(1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− ) 
Proof of Corollary 5. Let us define the function ( ) giving the expected net revenue
collected by the tax agency as a function of both the probability  of submitting true reports in
case of positive profits and the auditing cost  when the tax report is not disclosed. According
to Corollary 4, the function  is given by
( ) =  () = (+  (1−))  (14)
+
[(1− ) (1−)  (1 + )]2
4 ((1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )) +
[(1− ) (1−)  (1− )]2
4 ((1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )) 
Similarly, we define the function () giving the expected net revenue collected by the tax agency
as a function of the auditing cost  when the tax report is disclosed. Again, according to Corollary
4, the function  is given by
() =  () =  (15)
+
[(1−)  (1 + )]2
4 ((1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− )) +
[(1−)  (1− )]2
4 ((1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )) 
We clearly see that () = (0 ), which is a consequence of the fact that the strategic managers
always report low profits under disclosure. Moreover
()
  0 for all 
Let us define the function () relating the probability of reporting high profits with the the
auditing cost  as follows:
() = 1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸
 (16)
According to (6), there exists a value  of the auditing cost,
 = 1
∙
 (1−) (1 + )
 (1−) (1 + ) + (1− ) (1− )
¸

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such that for all      0 and for all     = 0 Therefore, () = 0 and ()  0 for
all    Moreover, () = (() ) for all    that is, the expected net revenues collected by
the tax agency are the same under disclosure and under no disclosure when the cost  of auditing
is suﬃciently large since in this case the strategic managers always cheat under the two disclosure
regimes.
We next compute the derivative of the expected net revenue under no disclosure evaluated at
the threshold value  of the auditing cost,
(() )

¯¯¯¯
=
=
(0 )

¯¯¯¯
=
+
( )

¯¯¯¯
=0
· ()
¯¯¯¯
=
(17)
=
()

¯¯¯¯
=
+
( )

¯¯¯¯
=0
· ()
¯¯¯¯
=
 (18)
After some tedious algebra, we get
( )

¯¯¯¯
=0
=
2(1− )(1−)(1− )
(1 + ) ((1−)(1− ) + (1− )(1 + ))  0
and
()
 = −
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸
 0 for all 
Therefore,
( )

¯¯¯¯
=0
· ()
¯¯¯¯
=
 0
which according to (17) implies that
(() )

¯¯¯¯
=
 ()
¯¯¯¯
=
 0
Therefore, since () = (() ) there exists an interval (b ) such that
 () = (() )  () =  () for  ∈ (b ) 
Let us now define the function () = (() )− () so that, using (14) and (15)  we get
() = () (1−)  − [() (1−)  (1 + )]
2
4 ((1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− ))
− [() (1−)  (1− )]
2
4 ((1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )) 
We use (16) to substitute for () in the previous expression to obtain,
() =
µ
1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸¶
(1−) 
−
∙µ
1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸¶
(1−)  (1 + )
¸2
4 ((1 + ) (1−) + (1− ) (1− ))
−
∙µ
1− 
∙
1 +
(1− ) (1− )
(1−)  (1 + )
¸¶
(1−)  (1− )
¸2
4 ((1− ) (1−) + (1 + ) (1− )) 
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Note that () can be written as a fraction of polynomials in , where the numerator will be
quadratic in  Therefore, () has at most two roots. We know that one of the roots is
 =  as () = (() ) Note that the other root  of () is smaller than  This is so
because we know from our previous argument that there exists an interval (b ) such that
() = (() ) − ()  0. However, as we argue in the main text, if the auditing cost  is
suﬃciently low, then all low reports are inspected. Therefore, under no disclosure the manager
always tells the truth as  converges to 1 as  tends to 0 so that the expected tax revenue
tends to  However, under disclosure the manager always reports  = 0 and, if all those reports
are audited then the expected tax revenue becomes  + (1 −) where the first term of
the sum is the amount of taxes paid by the honest manager and the second is the amount of fines
paid by the strategic manager. Since   1, then a disclosure policy dominates a no-disclosure
policy from the tax agency viewpoint as the former generates larger expected revenues when
the auditing cost  is close to zero. That is, () = (() ) − ()  0 for an auditing cost 
suﬃciently small.
Proof of Corollary 6. (i) The derivative of the expected revenue in the disclosure regime with
respect to the auditing cost is
 ()
 =
−
2 (1−)2
£
−  (1−) + 32− 32 + 2 (1−)− 1
¤
22 [−− +  (1−) + +  (1−) + 1] [−+ −  (1−) + +  (1−)− 1] ≤ 0
for all 0 ≤   ≤ 1
Similarly, the derivative of the expected revenue in the no-disclosure regime with respect to
the auditing cost  is
 ()
 =
−
2
2
"
(− 1) (− 1) +  (1−) (+ 1)
£
−4+ − 2+ 4+ 2 + 2 (1−)− 1
¤
(+ 1)2 ((+ 1) (− 1) +  (1−) (− 1))
#
≤ 0
for all 0 ≤   ≤ 1
(ii) We next perform the comparative statics with respect to the probability  of the informed
trader being selected to trade,
 ()
 =
42(1−)2 (1− )2 [1− + (1−)]
 [(− 1) (− 1) + (1−) (+ 1)]2 [(+ 1) (− 1) + (1−) (− 1)]2
≥ 0
and
 ()
 =
42 (1− )2
£
− 2+ 2(1−) + 2− − 2 − (1−) + 2(1−) + 2
¤
(+ 1)3 [(+ 1) (− 1) + (1−) (− 1)]2
≥ 0
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